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1  Introduction 
This paper investigates empirically the sources of real exchange rate fluctuations in eight Central 
and East European (CEE) new European Union (EU) member states: the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. At the time this paper was written 
five of these countries had already joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II), fixing their 
parities against the euro in the run-up to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) membership. 
All ten countries that became members of the EU on 1
st May 2004 are obliged to adopt the euro as 
soon  as  they  have  fulfilled  the  Maastricht  criteria;  none  has  the  formal  right,  exercised  by 
Denmark and the United Kingdom, to opt out from the EMU arrangements. The timing of the 
euro  adoption,  however,  depends  largely  on  these  countries’  economic  policy  decisions,  in 
particular  the  decision  to  join  the  ERM II.  One  possibility  of delaying the EMU membership 
would simply be failing to fulfil the exchange rate stability criterion, just as Sweden has done. 
Interestingly  enough,  the  countries  not  (yet)  participating  in  the  ERM II  are  the  largest  CEE 
economies: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the latter also being the least open one. The 
fact  that  only  the  smaller  and  more  open  CEE  countries  have  already  joined  the  mechanism 
complies with the widely accepted proposition that nominal exchange rate flexibility does more 
harm than good to small open economies, particularly with regard to macroeconomic stability (see 
McKinnon, 1963).  Consequently,  small  open  economies  should  find  fixed  exchange  rates  in 
general and the accession to a monetary union in particular more advantageous than larger and 
less open ones.
1 
Fixing the nominal exchange rate has vital consequences for the ability of the real exchange rate 
to  absorb  real  asymmetric,  i.e. country specific shocks. In the short run, given sluggish price 
adjustment,  the  nominal  exchange  rate  is  the  decisive  factor  driving  the  real  exchange  rate. 
Consequently, fixing the former directly translates into reduced flexibility of the latter. It has 
become  a  stylised  fact  of  the  international  monetary  economics  that  real  rates  tend  to  be 
significantly more volatile under floating than under fixed nominal rates. The essential point is to 
what extent real exchange rate fluctuations mirror the real economy and to what extent they result 
from innovations springing up from the financial markets. 
The exchange rate economics provides, broadly speaking, two different explanations as to the 
sources of real exchange rate fluctuations (when prices are sluggish, in the short run both apply to 
nominal rates, too). The first approach, which is referred to as the disequilibrium view, presumes 
that the largest part of exchange rate volatility can be attributed to financial market disturbances, 
or nominal disturbances. The second approach, termed the real economy view or the equilibrium 
view, posits that real rates move so as to accommodate shocks to real macroeconomic variables, 
helping to bring about the necessary adjustment. 
                                                 
1 One should not forget, though, that even the largest of all CEE countries account for very small fractions of the 
aggregate EU GDP. Obviously, the above considerations concern the size of these countries relative to each other.   2 
Directly linked to this issue is the question of the usefulness of flexible nominal exchange rates as 
shock absorbing instruments. The disequilibrium view postulates that the nominal exchange rate 
is a propagator of shocks that spring up from the financial markets, in particular from the foreign 
exchange markets, whereas the real economy view treats the nominal rate as an absorber of real 
shocks. Thus, according to the former approach, fixing the parity would shield the real economy 
from  nominal  shocks  and  thus  prove  beneficial  with  regard  to  macroeconomic  stability. 
According to the latter approach, in contrast, a country would find it relatively costly (in terms of 
stability of real macroeconomic aggregates) to give up nominal exchange rate flexibility, provided 
that prices are sluggish. As discussed in Section 2 of this paper, both views are plausible and both 
are supported by empirical evidence. Hence, the question as to which of them is the “correct” one 
for a given economy essentially boils down to an empirical one. 
We therefore investigate empirically the sources driving real exchange rate fluctuations in the 
CEE economies and try to answer the question whether these countries’ decisions to join or not to 
join  the  ERM II  reflect  the  above  considerations.  As  the  (irrevocable)  fixing  of  the  nominal 
exchange rate should be more appealing for those CEE countries whose real rates fluctuate mainly 
in response to nominal shocks, we expect the real rates in those countries that already participate 
in the ERM II to comply with the disequilibrium view described above. In contrast, the economies 
that have yet to join the ERM II are expected to reflect the real economy approach. Intuitively, a 
country  whose  exchange  rate  plays  the  role  of  a  shock  absorbing  instrument  would  be  less 
inclined to give this instrument up than a country whose exchange rate acts as a shock propagator. 
At this point, two qualifications are in order. Firstly, some of the CEE countries, notably the 
Baltic states, which have maintained currency boards since the beginning of the 1990s, had given 
up  nominal  exchange  rate  flexibility  long  before  they  joined  the  ERM  II  (see  Table 1  in 
Section 4).  Nevertheless,  although  a  currency  board  does  impart  giving  up  monetary  policy 
independence,  the  exchange  rate  cannot  be  treated  as  irrevocably  fixed,  as  e.g.  the  recent 
Argentina crisis demonstrated. Therefore, we stress that only joining a fully-fledged monetary 
union like the EMU amounts to an (almost) irrevocable fixing of the nominal exchange rate.
2 
Secondly and more importantly, the decision to join or not to join the ERM II and later the euro 
zone is ultimately a political one, although it should be primarily based, at least in theory, on 
economic  costs  and  benefits  considerations.  The  three  largest  of  the  new  EU  member  states 
obviously lack the political will to adopt the euro and fail to bring their budget deficits down to 
the level stipulated by the Treaty of Maastricht; these are the two reasons for their failure to 
follow in the footsteps of the five smaller CEE countries. Still, we believe that it is insightful to 
empirically  analyse  the  question  whether  these  countries’  decisions  concerning  the  ERM  II 
participation have sound economic foundations as far as the usefulness of their nominal exchange 
rates as shock absorbing instruments is concerned. 
                                                 
2 Fully-fledged currency unions can break up too, as the examples of the former Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia show.   3 
The analysis is based upon a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model developed by Clarida 
and Gali (1994), which employs a long-run identification scheme pioneered by Blanchard and 
Quah (1989). A VAR system consisting of three variables – the rate of change in the real output, 
in the real exchange rate and in the price level – is estimated to draw inference on the three types 
of structural disturbances that constitute the driving forces of the variation in these variables. We 
would have liked to be able to interpret these disturbances as real aggregate supply, real aggregate 
demand and nominal shocks, respectively. However, the subsequent analysis showed that such 
interpretation was economically implausible so that the above names should be thought of as 
simplifying  labels  only.  One  should  bear  in  mind  that  shocks  identified  within  a  SVAR 
framework are actually defined by their impact on the variables in the VAR. Specifically, “real 
supply” shocks in our model are defined as those which can exert long-run influence over all 
system variables, “real demand” shocks as those which can permanently affect prices or the real 
exchange rate but not the real income, and “nominal” shocks as those which can only affect the 
price level in the long run. Importantly, the interpretation problems that we encountered do not 
invalidate  the  analysis  because  its  aim  was  essentially  to  answer  the  question  whether  it  is 
primarily permanent or temporary (rather than supply, demand or nominal) disturbances that have 
driven the real exchange rates of the CEE economies. 
To shed light on that question, we compute the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) 
based on the identification scheme just described. The results of this exercise are striking in that 
they suggest exactly the opposite of what we expected. In the short run, a substantial amount of 
the variance of the rate of change in the respective real exchange rate against the euro is due to 
“nominal” (i.e. temporary) shocks in those CEE countries that have not yet joined the ERM II. In 
countries  that  are  ERM II  participants  –  with  the  exception  of  Latvia,  although  this  result  is 
specification sensitive – “real demand” (i.e. permanent) shocks are the main force driving real 
exchange rate changes. That is to say, the former group of economies seems to comply with the 
disequilibrium view and the latter with the real economy view of exchange rate fluctuations. This 
finding might be primarily due to the different exchange rate regimes of the countries analysed. 
However, comparing ERM II vs. non-ERM II countries that were on the same or similar exchange 
rate regimes throughout the period under scrutiny again reveals the same pattern. We conclude 
that, provided that the model employed is the proper one for our analysis and correctly specified, 
the  sources  of  real  exchange  rate  fluctuations  were  not  the  decisive  factor  behind  the  CEE 
countries’ decisions concerning the ERM II participation and the later adoption of the euro. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the sources of real exchange rate fluctuations in developed and in transition 
economies. Then, the econometric methodology used to identify the sources of real exchange rate 
fluctuations in the CEE countries is presented in Section 3. Section 4 provides an overview of 
exchange rate regimes in the CEE economies on their way to the EMU, presents the data and 
discusses the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes. 
   4 
2  Sources of real exchange rate fluctuations 
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed nominal exchange rates in the early 
1970s,  the  volatility  of  real  exchange  rates  has  increased  dramatically.  In  this  recent  floating 
period, real exchange rate fluctuations have gone almost step-in-step with nominal exchange rate 
changes  and  have  consequently  shown  the  same  high  level  of  persistence
3;  the  correlation 
between the two is near unity. These empirical regularities, which were extensively analysed in an 
influential paper by Mussa (1986), among others, have become stylised facts of the exchange rate 
economics.  Quite  naturally,  the  question  has  arisen  as  to  the  sources  of  the  higher  real  rate 
volatility under floating than under fixed nominal rates, and specifically, as to whether it is the 
nominal exchange rate changes that drive real rate fluctuations or whether the causality chain is 
the reverse. Two contrasting views have been put forward on that question. 
On the one hand, Mussa (1986) points out that the substantial and systematic differences in the 
pattern  of  real  exchange  rate  fluctuations  contradict  the  hypothesis  of  nominal  exchange  rate 
regime  neutrality.  Rather,  they  are  consistent  with  theories  that  contrast  the  “asset  price” 
behaviour of nominal exchange rates under floating with the relatively sluggish adjustment of 
national price levels under both floating and fixed rates. These theories, on their part, are in line 
with what can be observed from data: 
“Given  the  volatility  of  real  exchange  rates  under  floating  exchange  rate  regimes,  ratios  of 
national  price  levels  exhibit  too-little  volatility  under  fixed  exchange  rate  regimes.  Given  the 
stability of real exchange rates under fixed exchange rate regimes, ratios of national price levels 
exhibit too-little volatility under floating exchange rate regimes. Specifically, ratios of national 
price levels under floating exchange rate regimes do not move enough to offset the volatility of 
nominal exchange rates under floating exchange rate regimes and thereby preserve the stability 
of real exchange rates observed under fixed exchange rate regimes. … the conclusion must be that 
ratios of national price levels show too little volatility, under one exchange rate regime or the 
other,  relative  to  that  implied  by  the  hypothesis  of  nominal  exchange  regime  neutrality.” 
[Mussa (1986, p. 200)] 
In  other  words,  Mussa  advocates  the  so  so-called  “disequilibrium  view”  of  exchange  rate 
fluctuations, originally due to Mundell (1962), Fleming (1962) and Dornbusch (1976), stressing 
that  it  is  the  high  volatility  of  nominal  rates  that  drives  the  real  exchange  rates.  In  contrast, 
Stockman (1983) shows that the significant differences between the real exchange rate behaviour 
under fixed and flexible nominal rates can be explained without postulating the sluggishness of 
national  price  levels  adjustment.  Specifically,  Stockman  develops  an  equilibrium  model  of 
exchange  rates  that  incorporates  the  nominal  regime  neutrality,  but  only  under  certain 
assumptions. Although his empirical findings confirm the statistically significant impact of the 
nominal regime on the real exchange rate volatility, he argues that this does not establish the 
direction of causality: the higher volatility of real rates under floating might simply reflect the fact 
that countries whose real exchange rates are subject to greater real disturbances are more likely to 
                                                 
3 This effect was termed the purchasing power parity puzzle by Rogoff (1996) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000).   5 
float their currencies (incidentally, this possibility was also acknowledged by Mussa). This is the 
so-called “real economy view”. 
Stockman (1988)  further  develops  his  equilibrium  model  of  exchange  rates,  putting  forward 
another argument in favour of the real economy view. The argument goes as follows. Real shocks 
alter  real  exchange  rates  as  well  as  nominal  exchange  rates  (under  floating)  or  the  level  of 
international reserves (under pegged nominal rates). Obviously, disturbances that would lead to a 
real – and nominal, if prices are sticky – depreciation when the nominal rate is floating entail 
reserve losses under fixed rates. Faced with reserve losses that, if large enough, could create a 
balance of payments crisis and a forced devaluation, countries that choose a pegged exchange rate 
system  are  more  inclined  to  impose  trade  restrictions,  such  as  tariffs  and  quotas,  or  capital 
controls.  Stockman  argues  that  agents’  expectations  of  such  policies  tend  to  stabilize  real 
exchange  rate  fluctuations.  This  effect  alone,  without  the  assumption  of  sluggish  price  level 
adjustment relative to the “asset price” behaviour of nominal exchange rates, can account for the 
differences between the patterns of real rate behaviour under alternative nominal regimes. 
As MacDonald (1998) notes, an important difference between the two views described above is 
the question of causality: whether it runs from nominal to real exchange rates, as postulated by the 
disequilibrium view, or the reverse, as the real economy view seems to posit. Closely connected 
with this issue is the question of the usefulness of a flexible nominal exchange rate as a shock 
absorbing instrument. The disequilibrium approach posits that the largest part of real exchange 
rate volatility under floating can be attributed to financial market shocks, or nominal shocks. The 
flexible nominal rate is therefore a propagator of shocks that spring up from financial markets, 
particularly from foreign exchange markets. Consequently, fixing the parity would shield the real 
economy  from  such  disturbances  and  thus  prove  beneficial  with  regard  to  macroeconomic 
stability. In contrast, the equilibrium approach presumes that real exchange rates fluctuations tend 
to accommodate shocks to real macroeconomic variables like output or employment. In other 
words, real (and, if prices are sticky, also nominal) exchange rates change so as to bring about 
rapid adjustment of relative prices in the face of real disturbances that call for such adjustment, 
acting  as  an  equilibrating  force  when  asymmetric,  i.e.  country  specific  real  shocks  occur. 
Accordingly, a country would find it relatively costly in terms of macroeconomic stability to give 
up nominal exchange rate flexibility, again provided that prices are sluggish. 
In this paper, we do not take an a priori stand on the question which of the two approaches is the 
“right” one. On the one hand, we do implicitly assume, in line with Mussa (1986), that nominal 
rigidities account for a large part of the high real rates volatility under floating. On the other hand, 
we do not exclude the possibility that countries which experience larger real disturbances tend to 
adopt flexible rather than pegged nominal exchange rates, as Stockman (1983) argues. As the 
rationale behind each of these approaches seems plausible to us, the question as to which of them 
is “correct” for a given economy essentially boils down to an empirical one. 
The rapid development of methods of econometric analysis on the one hand and econometric 
software on the other since the end of the 1980s has brought about vast empirical literature on the   6 
sources  of  real  exchange  rate  fluctuations.  MacDonald (1998)  distinguishes  four  alternative 
empirical approaches that seek to shed light on this question. The first involves an examination of 
the  relationship  between  real  exchange  rates  and  real  interest  differentials,  which  should  be 
present  in  the  data  if  the  propositions  of  the  disequilibrium  view  hold.  The  second  is  to 
decompose the real exchange rate changes into permanent and transitory components, usually by 
means  of  the  decomposition  method  pioneered  by  Beveridge  and  Nelson (1981).  The  third 
approach, drawing upon the Balassa-Samuelson theorem, consists in decomposing real exchange 
rate fluctuations into parts due to changes in internal and external relative prices, i.e. movements 
in the relative price of traded to non-traded goods within countries and in the relative price of 
traded goods across countries. Finally, the fourth approach involves estimating a VAR model with 
(the change in) the real exchange rate as one of the endogenous variables and, using the long-run 
identification scheme developed by Blanchard and Quah (1989), decomposing real exchange rate 
movements into parts due to different structural shock types. 
In  this  paper  we  employ  that  last  approach  to  investigate  the  sources  of  real  exchange  rate 
fluctuations in the CEE countries. The method itself and the criticisms it evokes are discussed in 
Section 3.  In  the  remainder  of  this  section  we  provide  a  brief  overview  over  the  empirical 
literature  that  adopts  this  approach  as  well  as  the  empirical  findings  for  developed  and  for 
transition countries. For a detailed presentation of the first three groups of methods, along with the 
results  obtained  using  them,  see  MacDonald (1998).  The  general  upshot  is  that  both  views 
described above are supported by empirical evidence, depending on the method used and the 
exact specification of the model. 
Lastrapes (1992) was among the first to analyse the sources of exchange rate fluctuations using 
the Blanchard and Quah (1989) approach. The variables in his bivariate VAR model are the rates 
of change in the real and in the nominal exchange rate. Lastrapes identifies two types of structural 
disturbances, of which one has no long-run impact on the real exchange rate level but can affect 
the level of the nominal rate, and one can influence the levels of both variables in the long run; he 
interprets the former as a nominal shock and the latter as a real shock. Lastrapes analyses six 
countries: the United States (US), Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), Japan, Italy, and Canada 
over the period 1973 to 1989, using monthly data. His results indicate that for all countries under 
scrutiny and at all frequencies, real shocks account for the major part of both real and nominal 
exchange rate fluctuations, which is consistent with the real economy view. 
Another seminal piece of work in this strand of literature is due to Clarida and Gali (1994), whose 
framework we employ in this paper. The authors develop a three-equation stochastic two-country, 
rational expectations open macro model that exhibits the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch properties 
in the short run when prices are sluggish to adjust. Based on the model, Clarida and Gali specify a 
trivariate VAR with the rate of change in the real output, in the real exchange rate and in the price 
level  as  endogenous  variables.  The  three  structural  disturbance  types  that  are  identified  are 
interpreted  as  real  aggregate  supply  shocks  (those  which  can  influence  the  level  of  all  three 
variables in the long run), real aggregate demand shocks (those which have no long-run impact on   7 
the real output level) and nominal shocks (those which only affect the price level in the long run). 
The analysis, based on quarterly data, covers four countries: Japan, Germany, the UK, and Canada 
(and implicitly the US, since all variables are measured relative to that country) over the floating 
period 1973 to 1992. The results suggest that in the former two countries nominal disturbances 
explain a substantial amount of the variance in the real exchange rate against the dollar, whereas 
in the latter two the real rate fluctuations are mainly driven by real demand shocks; real supply 
shocks play virtually no role in any of the countries under study. Hence, Japan and Germany seem 
to comply with the disequilibrium view of real exchange rate fluctuations, while the UK and 
Canada conform to the real economy view. Our explanation of these results is that the former two 
economies possibly exhibit a higher degree of nominal rigidities than the latter two, so that the 
real exchange rate reacts strongly to any nominal disturbances (see also Section 5). 
The  models  of  Lastrapes (1992)  and  Clarida  and  Gali (1994)  set  a  benchmark  for  researchers 
seeking to explain real exchange rate movements. Chadha and Prasad (1997) carry out the same 
analysis as in the latter study for the slightly later period 1975 to 1996, applying the trivariate 
VAR described above to quarterly data for Japan. Their findings confirm those of Clarida and 
Gali, with the important difference that the contribution of real supply shocks to real exchange 
rate  fluctuations  is  larger  and  statistically  significant  at  all  forecast  horizons.  Funke (2000) 
estimates the same model for the UK vs. the Euroland, using quarterly data from 1980 to 1997. He 
shows that most of the variation in the sterling’s real exchange rate against the ECU is caused by 
real demand innovations. 
The simpler two-dimensional model of Lastrapes (1992) has usually been adopted in studies of 
emerging rather than developed economies. One of important exceptions is the paper of Enders 
and Lee (1997), who apply this model to Canada, Germany and Japan relative to the US, using 
monthly  data  for  the  floating  period  1973  to  1992.  Their  results  are  consistent  with  that  of 
Lastrapes:  real  shocks  account  for  the  major  part  of  both  real  and  nominal  exchange  rate 
fluctuations. Chowdhury (2004) explores the sources of movements in real exchange rates against 
the US dollar in Chile, Colombia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Uruguay, applying the 
model  of  Lastrapes  to  monthly  data  from  1980  to  1996.  His  conclusion,  rather  unusual  for 
transition  countries  (see  below),  is  that  real  shocks  clearly  dominate  nominal  shocks  in  all 
countries  under  scrutiny.  Soto (2003)  estimates  a  VAR  with  the  rate  of  change  in  the  real 
exchange rate of the Chilean peso against a basket of currencies and the interest rate differential 
between Chile and the international capital market (as proxied by LIBOR) on the basis of monthly 
data from 1990 to 1999. The results show that in the longer run, real shocks account for the 
greater part of the real rate volatility; however, nominal shocks play an important role in the short 
run. 
Several  authors  extend  the  VAR  dimension  and  thus  the  menu  of  structural  disturbances 
identifiable  within  this  framework.
4  Weber (1997)  specifies  a  five-dimensional  VAR  with  the 
labour input, the real output, the real exchange rate, the real money supply, and the price level and 
                                                 
4 One can only identify as many independent shock types as there are variables in the VAR.   8 
identifies five disturbance types: labour supply, productivity, aggregate demand, money demand, 
and money supply shocks. Applying the model to monthly data for the US vs. Germany, the US 
vs. Japan and Germany vs. Japan, spanning the period 1971 to 1994, Weber finds that the major 
part of the short-term volatility in the real exchange rates is attributable to demand shocks and a 
much smaller proportion to monetary shocks, while supply-side shocks play virtually no role. 
Rogers (1999) also estimates a VAR with five endogenous variables (the rate of change in the real 
government spending, in the real income, in the real exchange rate, in the money multiplier, and 
in the real monetary base) and five innovation types (fiscal, supply, demand or preference, money 
multiplier, and monetary base disturbances), using over 100 years of annual data (1889-1992) for 
the US and the UK. In addition to the baseline model he tries several alternative specifications, 
embodying different assumptions about the effects of the various shock types. The results suggest 
that nominal disturbances, i.e. those to the money supply or the money multiplier, account for 
nearly 50 percent of the variation in the real exchange rate over short horizons; in the alternative 
models the contribution of these shocks amounts to at least 20 percent. 
A  kind  of  stylised fact to emerge from this strand of literature is that real exchange rates of 
developed (low-inflation) countries are mainly driven by real or permanent shocks, whereas the 
movements in the real rates of emerging (high-inflation) economies are predominantly attributable 
to nominal or temporary shocks. The above-discussed results of Rogers (1999), who argues that 
most studies understate the role of nominal shocks for real exchange rate fluctuations in industrial 
countries,  are  a  notable  exception.  Importantly,  Rogers  stresses  that  the  results  of  SVAR 
modelling are sensitive to specification, an issue to which we will return at the end of this paper. 
The sensitivity to specification can also be observed in studies of CEE economies. Dibooglu and 
Kutan (2000) were among the first to apply the structural VAR approach to study the sources of 
real exchange rate fluctuations in these countries. The authors specify a bivariate VAR with the 
rate  of  change  in  the  real  exchange  rate  and  in  the  price  level  as  endogenous  variables,  and 
identify  two  structural  innovation  types,  one  nominal  (with  no  long-run  impact  on  the  real 
exchange rate) and one real. Using monthly data from 1990 to 1999 for Hungary and Poland, the 
authors find that real exchange rate movements are driven mainly by real disturbances in the 
former  country  and  predominantly  by  nominal  shocks  in  the  latter  country.  Borghijs  and 
Kuijs (2004) focus on five CEE economies: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia. Using monthly data covering the floating period in these countries (from 1993 or later to 
2003), they estimate bivariate VAR models with the rate of change in the nominal exchange rate 
and in the real output as endogenous variables, and trivariate ones similar to that of Clarida and 
Gali (1994), with the difference that nominal exchange rates are used instead of prices. They find 
that  the  real  exchange  rates  of  all  these  countries  are  driven  mainly  by  nominal  shocks  and 
conclude that the flexible nominal exchange rates have been propagators of such shocks rather 
than stabilisation instruments. 
In a larger study, Kontolemis and Ross (2005) analyse nine of the ten new EU member states 
(Malta is not included in the sample) over the period 1986 or later to 2003. They try several   9 
specifications:  a  bivariate  VAR  like  that  of  Lastrapes (1992),  a  trivariate  VAR  like  that  of 
Borghijs  and  Kuijs (2004),  and  a  four-dimensional  model  with  the  same  variables  as  in  the 
trivariate one and interest rates or, alternatively, credit to the private sector. In contrast to Borghijs 
and Kuijs, the results of Kontolemis and Ross indicate that real exchange rate fluctuations are 
predominantly due to real demand shocks, although the role of nominal shocks and in particular 
credit shocks is also significant over short horizons; in contrast, interest rate shocks have virtually 
no effect on real exchange rates. As can be seen from the above examples, results vary widely 
across studies, depending on the exact model specification and data used. Therefore, one has to be 
cautious when interpreting the findings of any specific model, especially when the conclusions are 
to be drawn upon when formulating policy recommendations. 
 
3  Econometric methodology 
Let 
[ ]        ′ ∆ ∆ ∆ = t t t t p q y X , 
where  ∆ denotes the difference operator,  ( )
EMU home
t t t y y y − =  is the difference between the real 
income in the home country and the real income in the EMU,  ( ) t t t p e q − =  is the real exchange 
rate of the domestic currency against the euro,  t e  is the nominal exchange rate (the price of euro 
in units of domestic currency), and  ( )
EMU home
t t t p p p − =  is the difference between the domestic 
price level and the price level in the EMU. All variables are in logarithms so that their differences 
can be interpreted as the rate of change in the underlying variable.  t y ,  t q  and  t p  are assumed to 
be integrated of order 1 (so that the variables in  t X  are stationary) and not cointegrated (because 
they follow different stochastic trends in the long run). 
We use real income and price differentials against the respective euro zone aggregates as our 
system variables because our focus is on shocks that are asymmetric with regard to the EMU. An 
alternative specification would involve including absolute values of these variables in the system 
(i.e. 
home Y log t t y =  and 
home P log t t p = ) and estimating a separate VAR for the euro zone, which 
would  allow  us  to  identify  any  shocks  and  not  just  the  asymmetric  ones.  Computing  simple 
correlation coefficients between the shock series in a given CEE country and the euro area would 
then be a way of judging the symmetry of the disturbances.
5 
Suppose that the true model can be represented by the following infinite vector moving average 
(VMA) process
6: 
                                                 
5 Artis and Ehrmann (2000) argue that specifying the variables in relative terms implies the assumption that shock 
transmission  mechanisms  in  the  analysed  countries  are  identical  as  in  the  reference  country.  Admittedly,  this 
assumption is not necessarily correct when applied to the CEE economies against the euro area. 
6 Equation (1)  can  also  include  deterministic  components  such  as  a  constant,  seasonal  and  other  dummies,  a 
deterministic trend, or other strictly exogenous variables. Our models do include such variables (see Table 5) but they 
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 (   ...   2,   , 1   , 0 = i ),  L is the lag operator, and  [ ]        3 2 1 ′ = t t t t ε ε ε ε  is a 
vector  of  identically  normally distributed, serially uncorrelated and mutually orthogonal white 
noise disturbances
7: 
( ) 0 = t E ε ,       ( ) I ' = Σ = ε ε ε t t E ,       ( ) [ ] t s E t s ≠ ∀ =       0 ' ε ε .                    (2) 
It is therefore assumed that the system variables are driven by past and present realizations of the 
underlying disturbances, so-called structural or primitive shocks. Note that the elements of  i A  are 
impulse response coefficients, e.g. the series  i a   12  (   ...   , 1   , 0 = i ) describes the dynamic response of 
the first variable in the system,  t y ∆ , to one-unit shocks of the second type,  i t−   2 ε . To recover the 
impulse response functions (IRF) as well as identify the past primitive shocks, one has to estimate 
and invert the following vector autoregression (VAR) representation of the process: 
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iL B L B
1
 is 
an invertible lag polynomial
8 and  [ ]        3 2 1 ′ = t t t t e e e e  is a vector of normally distributed shocks that 
are serially uncorrelated but can be contemporaneously correlated with each other: 




















       
       





e t te e E ,       ( ) [ ] t s e e E t s ≠ ∀ =       0 ' .                 (5) 
Comparing equation (1) with equation (4) reveals that 






− − = Σ = Σ A A A A e ε .                             (7) 
As  0 A  is a  3 3×  matrix, we need nine parameters to convert the residuals from the estimated 
equation (3) into the original shocks that drive the behaviour of the endogenous variables. Of 
these nine, six are given by the elements of  e Σ ˆ  (three estimated variances and three estimated 
covariances  of  the  VAR  residuals).  For  the  system  to  be  just-identified,  the  missing  three 
parameters have to be obtained by making further assumptions about the structural shocks. 
                                                 
7 The assumption that each of the disturbances has a unit variance is nothing but a convenient normalisation. 
8 The polynomial is invertible if the VAR is stationary.   11 
Presume that the three structural shock types are aggregate supply (AS), aggregate demand (AD) 
and purely nominal or financial (LM) innovations and that they can be identified through their 
impact on the system variables. Specifically, let  t
s
t 1 ε ε ≡  be a supply shock,  t
d
t 2 ε ε ≡  a demand 
shock and  t
n
t 3 ε ε ≡  a nominal shock.
9 Assume further that AD shocks do not affect the level of 
the real income in the long run, whereas LM shocks have no long-run impact on either the real 
income level or the real exchange rate. These restrictions are general enough to incorporate a 
number of economic models of exchange rate determination, including the sticky-price monetary 
model  of  Dornbusch (1976),  which  we  have  in  mind  (see  also  the  discussion  below).  As  the 
variables in  t X  are in differences and not in levels, this means that the cumulated impact of the 
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Technically, making these assumptions amounts to imposing the following three restrictions on 
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A .                         (9) 
The system is now just-identified, which allows us to identify the past structural shocks (strictly 
speaking, their estimated values) and compute the IRF and the FEVD. The results for each of the 
eight CEE countries are presented and discussed in Section 4. 
The  long-run  identification  scheme  described  above  was  developed  by  Blanchard  and 
Quah (1989),  originally  as  a  technique  for  decomposing  real  output  into  its  permanent  and 
transitory components in a bivariate framework with the rate of change in the real output and the 
rate of unemployment as endogenous variables. Following a modification by Bayoumi (1992), 
replacing the unemployment rate with the rate of change in the price level, the scheme has been 
used in a large number of papers analysing the prospects of the European monetary integration, 
and later the EMU enlargement, in the light of the optimum currency area theory.
10 As discussed 
in  Section 2,  Lastrapes (1992)  was  among  the  first  to  apply  the  scheme  to  nominal  and  real 
exchange rates, aiming at identifying the sources of real and nominal exchange rate fluctuations. 
Lastrapes’ bivariate framework was later expanded to a trivariate one by Clarida and Gali (1994), 
whose model is the one described above. More-dimensional models, like those of Rogers (1999) 
or  Weber (1997),  followed  suit.  However,  the  problem  with  such  models  is,  firstly,  that  the 
number of coefficients to be estimated depends on the square of the number of variables in the 
VAR so the time series must be sufficiently long to allow estimation. Secondly, the number of 
identification  restrictions  to  be  imposed  on  the  system  is  also  a  square  function  of  the  VAR 
dimension: in a model with n endogenous variables ( ) 2
2 n n −  restrictions are needed for its just-
                                                 
9 The order in which the three shock types appear in the system is arbitrary and affects the results in no way. 
10 See, e.g., Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992a,b) or Babetski (2003).   12 
identification.  Obviously,  the  more  such  constraints  are  imposed,  the  more  they  amount  to 
“incredible  identification  restrictions”  used  in  structural  econometric  modelling,  which  were 
criticised in a seminal paper by Sims (1980). 
An important advantage of the identification scheme á la Blanchard and Quah (1989) is the fact 
that  no  contemporaneous  restrictions  are  imposed  on  the  system.  Therefore,  the  short-run 
dynamics of the endogenous variables in response to the various innovation types are allowed to 
be  fully  determined  by  the  data.  Nevertheless,  the  scheme  has  been  subject  to  a  number  of 
criticisms. Lippi and Reichlin (1993) point out that it is based on the assumption that the VMA 
representation is fundamental and argue that non-fundamental representations can lead to very 
different  results.  As  Blanchard  and  Quah (1993)  argue,  though,  this  is  a  general  problem  of 
dynamic econometric modelling: the assumption of fundamental error terms is implicitly made in 
most empirical studies using time series analysis methods. A more severe criticism, due to Faust 
and Leeper (1997), is that using long-run identification restrictions may be inappropriate in finite 
order VAR (and finite data samples). The problem is aggravated by the relatively short time span 
over which usable data are available for the transition economies under scrutiny. Using monthly 
instead of quarterly data, which we do, is one solution to the problem
11; employing a different 
identification scheme would be another. 
A related point reflects the general objection to VAR models that any inference from such models 
relies upon the identification restrictions applied, and the latter can be criticised on the grounds of 
economic theory. Firstly, the procedure at hand allows one to identify at most as many structural 
shock types as there are variables in the system. The assumption that there are only three types of 
primitive disturbances is certainly an important limitation of our model. If there were more than 
three shock types, each with different impact on the endogenous variables, using the restrictions 
described  above  would  lead  to  the  identification  of  some  linear  combinations  of  the  original 
shocks; this would mean that the identified shocks are not necessarily orthogonal.
12 Worse still, it 
might be that a shock identified in the VAR is a commingling of two or more innovation types 
that  have  opposite  effects  on  one  or  more  system  variables,  a  point  also  due  to  Faust  and 
Leeper (1997). If the reaction of the endogenous variables to a certain shock type poses serious 
interpretation  problems  (as  is  the  case  in  our  model,  see  next  section),  such  commingling  of 
shocks is probably the case. 
Secondly,  long-run  neutrality  assumptions  have  also  been  subject  to  severe  criticism. 
Buiter (1995, p. 35) dismisses the restriction that demand shocks have no long-run impact on the 
level of real income as “laughable” and points out that e.g. fiscal shocks can affect saving and 
capital formation and therefore the potential output. Moreover, many authors stress that nominal 
shocks can have long-run impact both on the real output and on the relative price of the foreign 
and domestic goods, e.g. through hysteresis effects. In particular, Farrant and Peersman (2005) 
                                                 
11 Still, using monthly data cannot solve the problem of our sample covering at most two business cycles, which can 
hardly amount to a “long run”. This is a general problem when modelling economies in transition. 
12 For a discussion of the orthogonality assumption itself see, e.g., Gottschalk (2001) and the references therein.   13 
use sign restrictions instead of long-run neutrality restrictions, which can be thought of as a single 
solution of a whole distribution of possible responses that are consistent with the more general 
sign constraints. They show that a number of IRF obtained by traditional zero restrictions are 
located  in  the  tails  of  the  distributions  of  all  possible  IRF.  Hence,  the  inference  drawn  from 
models using such restrictions can be misleading. 
Our response to that latter bunch of criticism is the simple reminder that the shocks identified in 
VAR  models  in  general  and  in  our  model  in  particular  are  not  some  objectively  identifiable 
disturbances. Ideally, the shocks that we seek to identify should be “structural”, i.e. unanticipated 
(coming  by  surprise),  unique  (directly  hitting  just  one  macroeconomic  aggregate  each)  and 
invariant to changes in the information set. One can hardly argue that this is the case as far as 
disturbances identifiable within the VAR framework are concerned. In particular, the quality of 
shocks being invariant to changes in the information set, which implies that an estimated shock 
should  not  change  when  e.g.  the  dimension  of  the  VAR  model  is  increased,  is  almost  never 
given.
13 The reason is that “true” or “structural” shocks – defined as stochastic changes to the 
system variables – are unobservable; one can only try to retrieve them from data with the help of 
certain assumptions. 
The question remains whether the assumptions used in this paper are plausible. Admittedly, not all 
nominal shocks are neutral in the long run and not all demand shocks have only temporary effects 
on the real income level. Nevertheless, the majority of all nominal shock types one can think of 
are neutral and the majority of disturbances to real demand do not affect real income level in the 
long run. We therefore argue, in line with Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Lastrapes (1992), that 
our  identification  restrictions  are  “approximately correct”. Moreover, we believe that they are 
actually correct once we bear in mind that the above criticism is only a matter of definition: 
shocks  that  can  be  tracked  down  by  a  VAR  model  are  in  fact  defined  by  the  identification 
restrictions. Instead of calling e.g.  t 2 ε  a demand shock, one can refer to it as “a shock that has no 
long-run impact on the real output level but can permanently influence the real exchange rate and 
the price level”, which is a rather long name. One can therefore consider the notions “supply”, 
“demand” and “nominal” shocks as short names for the three innovation types identified in our 
model. With these qualifications in mind, we can return to the shock interpretation question at the 
end of next section. 
 
4  Empirical results 
Table 1 provides an overview of the exchange rate regimes in the CEE economies on their way to 
the EMU. As can be seen from the table, these countries have been quite heterogeneous as regards 
their  exchange  rate  arrangements  during  the  last  15  years  or  so.  Of  eight  exchange  rate 
arrangements distinguished by the International Monetary Fund (2005), six have prevailed in the 
                                                 
13 See Juselius (2006), Chapter 13.2 for a discussion.   14 
CEE economies, ranging from a currency board (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) to pure floating 
(Poland).  During  the  1990s  the  CEE  countries  generally  moved  from  fixed  to  more  flexible 
exchange  rates  (with  the  exception  of  the  Baltic  states,  which  maintained  currency  boards 
throughout the whole period) and, when pegging, from the US dollar or a currency basket to the 
German mark and later the euro as reference currency. 
Table 1: Exchange rate regimes in the CEE countries 
Country  Date  Exchange rate regime 

















DEM (65%), USD (35%) 
DEM (65%), USD (35%) 
Reference currency: DEM 




































ECU (70%), USD (30%) 
DEM (70%), USD (30%) 













































































USD (45%), DEM (35%), GBP 
(10%), FF (5%), CHF (5%) 
USD (45%), DEM (35%), GBP 
(10%), FF (5%), CHF (5%) 
USD (45%), DEM (35%), GBP 
(10%), FF (5%), CHF (5%) 
USD (45%), DEM (35%), GBP 
(10%), FF (5%), CHF (5%) 
USD (45%), DEM (35%), GBP 
(10%), FF (5%), CHF (5%) 
EUR (55%), USD (45%) 









































Target zone / ERM II 
DEM (60%), USD (40%) 
DEM (60%), USD (40%) 
DEM (60%), USD (40%) 
DEM (60%), USD (40%) 
 
















Slovenia  01.1992 
28.06.2004 
Managed float 




a Defined as in International Monetary Fund (2005) 
b Dummy variables with the value 1 since the month of the respective regime change and 0 otherwise 
 
Source: Czech National Bank, Bank of Estonia, Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Bank of Latvia, Bank of Lithuania, 
National Bank of Poland, National Bank of Slovakia, Bank of Slovenia, and Babetski (2003)   15 
Tables 2  and  3  present  the  data  used  in  our  model.  As  the  countries  under  scrutiny  were  all 
centrally planned economies until the end of 1980s and the transition process towards a market 
economy lasted several years, the time span over which usable data are available is rather short. 
Quite arbitrarily, we decided that data are not usable until 1993 or so, as this was the time when 
the most dramatic structural changes occurred. This leaves us with a simple size of at most twelve 
years, which renders using quarterly data impossible; we therefore use monthly data. The sample 
size varies from country to country due to time series availability. It would have been optimal to 
use  an  identical  time  span  for  each  CEE  economy  but  facing  the  choice  between  better 
comparability of data and longer samples, we chose the latter. 
Table 2: Sample size 









1995:M1 – 2005:M12 
1995:M1 – 2005:M12 
1995:M1 – 2005:M10 
1996:M1 – 2005:M12 
1998:M1 – 2005:M12 
1996:M1 – 2005:M12 
1998:M1 – 2005:M12 










Our proxy for the real income is the volume index of industrial production and for the price level 
the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), which is reported for the countries in question 
beginning in 1995 (in 1996 for Poland and Latvia); this fact, along with the above considerations, 
set  the  beginning  of  our  sample.  As  indicated  in  Section 3,  both  variables  are  measured  as 
differentials relative to the respective euro area aggregates. The real exchange rates are computed 
from monthly average nominal exchange rates against the euro, whereby the deflator used is the 
Producer Price Index (PPI). For the period prior to the introduction of the euro, exchange rates 
against a “synthetic euro” are computed as a GDP weighted average of the euro legacy currencies. 
All variables used in our model are indexes based in 1999:M1 and are not seasonally adjusted. 
Table 3: Endogenous variables in vector autoregressions 
Variables in VAR  Definition  Source 
( )
EMU home
t t t y y y − ∆ = ∆  
j
t y  – industrial production 
a in country j; 
log of the volume index (1999:M1=100); 
not seasonally adjusted 
National governments (CEE 








+ − ∆ =
− ∆ = ∆
  t e  – nominal exchange rate against the 
euro (price of euro in units of domestic 
currency); log of an index (1999:M1=100); 
j
t p  – Producer Price Index in country j; 
log of the price index (1999:M1=100); 
not seasonally adjusted 
t e  – CEE countries’ national 
central banks (until 1998:M12); 
ECB (since 1999:M1); 
j
t p  – IMF International Financial 
Statistics (CEE countries); 
Eurostat (euro area) 
( )
EMU home
t t t p p p − ∆ = ∆   j
t p  – Harmonized Index of Consumer 
Prices in country j; log of the price index 





a Of manufactured goods only for Latvia and Lithuania   16 
Prior to model specification we look at the pattern of nominal and real exchange rate fluctuations. 
Figure 1 depicts month-on-month changes in the nominal and real rates. For better comparability 
across countries the exchange rates are logarithms of indexes (this time with the base 1995:M1) so 
that their differences can be interpreted as the rate of change in the underlying exchange rate. 
Note also that the vertical axis has the same scaling in all graphs. As can be seen from the figure, 
the real exchange rate fluctuations observed in the CEE economies follow the pattern described in 
Section 2: the real rate changes go almost step-in-step with nominal rate changes and are visibly 
less volatile under pegged than under floating nominal rates. 
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Changes in the nominal exchange rate






    a The data are the same as in Table 5 below. 
 
This finding is confirmed when looking at descriptive statistics (see Table 4). Firstly, the standard 
deviation of the real exchange rate is almost equal to that of the nominal exchange rate in all cases 
except for Estonia. Secondly, the simple correlation coefficients are all significant at the 1 percent 
level, have positive signs and are very high (between 0.5 and 0.96, again except for Estonia with 
the value of 0.23). Thirdly, not only nominal and real exchange rate levels (these have a unit root, 
see  below),  but  also  their  rates  of  change  show  a  relatively  high  degree  of  persistence,  as   17 
measured  by  the  first  order  autocorrelation  coefficient  (with  the  exception  of  Estonia  for  the 
nominal rate and the Czech Republic for both rates). We put the differential findings for Estonia 
down to its nominal exchange rate regime: as the only country in the sample, it maintained a hard 
peg against the German mark and later the euro throughout the whole period under study. 
Table 4: The rates of change in the nominal and real exchange rates – descriptive statistics 
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Country  Mean  Standard 
deviation 







































































a For definitions of the variables see Table 3 above. The sample covers the time span 1995:M1 – 20005:M12. 
  The underlying indexes have been re-based so that their value in 1995:M1 is log (100). 
b * = significant at the 10 percent level, ** = at the 5 percent level, *** = at the 1 percent level 
  
Before specifying a VAR for each country, we test all variables for the order of integration and, 
where applicable, for cointegration.
14 The results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test applied to 
levels and differences of the variables indicate that all levels have a unit root and all differences 
are stationary, so that all (level) variables are integrated of order 1. Johansen cointegration tests 
generally show no cointegrating relationships, although some of the results are borderline and / or 
sensitive to specification. All in all, we conclude that the formal requirements for the application 
of the Blanchard and Quah (1989) identification scheme are satisfied. 
When deciding upon the maximum lag length to use in the VAR,  p , we look at the Akaike, 
Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn information criteria as well as the liquidity ratio test (AIC, SC, HQ, 
and LR, respectively) and test the regression residuals for serial correlation. The AIC, HQ and LR 
point to twelve lags in most cases, whereas the SC usually suggests one or two lags. Because with 
such a short lag structure the residuals are serially correlated while with twelve lags they are not, 
and because we think that one or two lags cannot capture the dynamics of the system correctly, we 
set  p  at twelve in all models with the exception of those for Poland and Slovenia, where ten lags 
seem more appropriate. We also include a constant in each VAR and experiment with a number of 
dummy variables representing exchange rate regime changes as well as a linear trend term. A 
dummy or trend is included if it is significant according to the t-test in at least one equation; for 
details  see  Table  5.  Furthermore,  we  tried  using  seasonal  dummies  but  they  were  generally 
insignificant so we eventually left them out. All VAR are stable, i.e. all their roots lie within the 
unit circle, although several roots are near unity in absolute value. 
                                                 
14 The results of these tests are not reported here to save space. Like any other results, they are available upon request 
from the author.   18 
Table 5: Exogenous variables in vector autoregressions 
Country  Exogenous variables 






c, t, cz2, cz3 = euro 
c, est1 = euro 
c, t, hu2 = euro, hu3, hu4 





c, t, euro 
c, t, pl6 
c, t, euro 
c, t 
a c is a constant, t is a linear time trend, euro is a dummy variable with the value 1 since 1999:M1 
(start of the EMU) and 0 otherwise, and other variables are dummies defined in Table 1 above. 
 
As a first step in our analysis we look at the IRF, depicting the impact of the various shock types 
on  the  endogenous  variables,  in  order  to  verify  the  robustness  of  the  identification  scheme 
employed; the results are shown in Figure 2. Note that each IRF depicts the accumulated response 
of the differenced variable to a given shock, which is equivalent to the response of the respective 
level variable. A salient feature of all IRF is the high degree of shock persistence; the effects of 
even transitory shocks die out slowly over time. This is a direct consequence of the large absolute 
value of the VAR roots. Interestingly, and contrary to our expectations, the initial overshooting of 
the real exchange rate in response to real shocks can only be observed in Lithuania, Poland and, to 
a lesser degree, Slovenia. This effect is virtually nonexistent in the remaining five economies. 
The responses of all variables to a (one standard deviation positive) nominal shock relative to the 
euro area are consistent with those predicted by the economic theory: the relative real output rises 
and the real exchange rate depreciates in the short run, whereas the relative price level rises in the 
short and the long run. In most cases, the same applies to the impact of a relative real aggregate 
supply innovation on the real variables: the relative real income rises and, in Hungary and Poland, 
the  real  exchange  rate  depreciates,  whereas  it  appreciates  in  the  remaining  six  countries;  this 
perverse supply-side effect was also observed for the UK and Canada by Clarida and Gali (1994) 
and for the euro area in several subsequent studies (see MacDonald, 1998). The drop in relative 
prices following a relative supply shock, which can be observed in four economies, is utterly 
inconsistent  with  economic  theory,  though.  Moreover,  the  IRF  for  what  we  initially  called  a 
relative real aggregate demand disturbance pose more serious interpretation problems. Firstly, in 
four  countries  the  relative  real  income  initially  falls  after  being  hit  by  a  shock  of  this  type; 
secondly,  in  all  cases  the  real  exchange  rate  depreciates;  finally,  in  all  economies  except  for 
Lithuania the relative price level falls in response to this kind of shock. All these effects are 
contrary  to  what  we  would  expect.  Thus,  we  cannot  interpret  this  structural  shock  type  as  a 
relative real aggregate demand shock but rather, more generally, as a shock that has no long-run 
impact on the real output level but can permanently affect the other two variables. Similar remarks 
apply to what we called a relative real supply shock due to its effect on prices: it can only be 
interpreted as an innovation that influences all three variables in the long run. 
We see two possible explanations of these perverse effects. Firstly, our choice of the proxy for 
income,  i.e.  industrial  production,  does  not  reflect  the  growing  importance  of  services  in  the 
production and consumption basket. Choosing other aggregates, e.g. retail sales, exports etc., or 
intrapolating GDP series into monthly data might yield different results. Secondly, the system   19 
variables might be actually driven by more than just three types of structural disturbances. If this 
is the case, what we identify by our trivariate VAR are comminglings of the original shocks. A 
remedy for that would be to include more variables and more shock types in our model. Due to 
the relatively short time series available this is not a feasible solution, though. In the remainder of 
this paper we will continue to use the notions “relative real demand shocks” and “relative real 
supply shocks” for brevity, bearing in mind that these are only simplifying labels. 
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It is important to stress that the above-described interpretation problems are in fact not relevant to 
our research question. Our primary aim is to distinguish between permanent and temporary shocks 
to the real exchange rate and to assess the relative contribution of each shock type to real rate 
volatility. Certainly, it would be desirable that the identified permanent shocks be interpretable as 
relative  supply  or  relative  demand  disturbances.  Although  this  is  not  the  case,  the  research   21 
question of this paper – whether real exchange rate fluctuations in the CEE economies are driven 
primarily by permanent shocks (real economy view) or by temporary ones (disequilibrium view) – 
can still be analysed within our framework. 
To  shed  light  on  the  question  of  the  sources  of  real  exchange  rate  fluctuations  in  the  CEE 
countries, in a second step of our analysis we calculate the FEVD. The results, presented in Table 
6, are striking in that they suggest exactly the opposite of what we expected. In the short run 
(during  the  first  two  years  after  the  shock)  between  52  and  88  percent  of  the  forecast  error 
variance (FEV) of the rate of change in the respective real exchange rate against the euro is due to 
relative nominal shocks in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, and Poland. In contrast, these 
shocks account for 4 to 29 percent of the FEV in Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In 
the former group of countries relative real demand disturbances account for 1 to 29 percent of the 
FEV, whereas in the latter group of economies their contribution to the FEV varies between 56 
and 84 percent – again with an important exception, namely Lithuania, where they account for 
only 22 to 29 percent of the variance. Lithuania is the only CEE economy where relative real 
supply shocks play the dominant role in the short run: their contribution to the FEV of the rate of 
change in the real exchange rate amounts to 55 to 68 percent in the first 24 months after the shock. 
In all other countries the contribution of relative supply shocks to the fluctuations of the real 
exchange rate amounts to between 0.5 and 34 percent. Incidentally, the small aggregate supply 
component of real exchange rate fluctuations “has become something of a stylised fact in the 
literature on the economics of real exchange rates” (MacDonald 1998, p. 38). Bearing in mind that 
the countries under scrutiny are transition economies engaged in a catching-up process with the 
EMU, we find the relatively small contribution of relative supply shocks to real exchange rate 
volatility particularly interesting. 
To summarize, a substantial amount of the FEV of the change in the real exchange rate is due to 
nominal  shocks  in  those  CEE  countries  that  have  not  yet  joined  the  ERM II,  whereas  the 
fluctuations in the real exchange rate in countries that already participate in the ERM II are mainly 
due to relative real demand shocks; Latvia constitutes an exception in that its FEVD follow the 
pattern of the former group of countries. Therefore, the ERM II “outs” seem to comply with the 
disequilibrium view and the ERM II participants with the real economy view of exchange rate 
determination. 
These  results  might  be  primarily  due  to  the  different  nominal  exchange  rate  regimes  of  the 
countries analysed. As shown above, the real exchange rates fluctuate almost step-in-step with the 
nominal rates. We might therefore expect that the FEVD of real exchange rate changes simply 
reflect the different nominal exchange rate regimes. This effect can be observed when contrasting 
the FEVD for Latvia and those for Estonia. Both countries maintained a currency board during the 
whole sample period but the former adopted the SDR as its anchor currency until the end of 2004, 
while the latter was anchored to the German mark and later the euro from the very beginning. 
Consequently, Latvia was almost a floater against the euro during most of the sample.
15 Perhaps 
                                                 
15 “Almost” because the euro is one of the components of the SDR.   22 
not  surprisingly,  its  real  exchange  rate  is  mainly  driven  by  nominal  shocks,  just  like  that  of 
another  floater,  Poland.  In  contrast,  the  FEVD  for  Estonia  reveal  a predominant role for real 
demand shocks. 
Table 6: Forecast error variance decomposition of the rate of change in the real exchange rate 
Forecast horizon  Czech Republic  Estonia  Hungary  Latvia 
(months)  s ε  
d ε  
n ε  
s ε  
d ε  
n ε  
s ε  
d ε  
n ε  
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d ε  
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The next step in our analysis is thus confronting the results for non-ERM II vs. ERM II economies 
that were on the same or very similar exchange rate regimes during most of the period under 
scrutiny. A direct comparison is possible only for the Czech Republic (an ERM II “out”) on the 
one hand and Slovakia and Slovenia (ERM II participants) on the other, as the exchange rate 
arrangements of these countries were almost identical over the past ten years. The contribution of 
relative nominal shocks to the FEV of the real exchange rate changes over the first 24 months 
after the shock amounts to between 72 and 80 percent in the Czech Republic, between 14 and 29 
percent in Slovakia and between 13 and 18 percent in Slovenia. In contrast, relative real demand 
disturbances account for 18 to 23 percent of the FEV in the Czech Republic, 56 to 75 percent in 
Slovakia and 67 to 84 percent in Slovenia. Thus, the same pattern as the one described above is 
again revealed. 
To check the robustness of our findings, we also estimated VAR models based on a different 
definition of the real exchange rate, using the HICP as deflator instead of the PPI. This alternative 
specification leaves the results by and large unchanged. Only seven of the total of 72 IRF, which 
are not reported here to save space, have a different shape than in the baseline model. The FEVD 
are qualitatively similar, with an important exception: the real rate changes in Latvia are primarily 
due  to  real  demand  shocks,  i.e.  Latvia  ceases  to  be  an  outlier  among  the  ERM II 
participants.
16 Very similar results are obtained when the models are estimated for the shorter time 
period starting in 1999:M1, after the launch of the euro: again, Latvia is not an outlier. These 
findings confirm our baseline results concerning the sources of real exchange rate fluctuations in 
the CEE countries. 
 
5  Conclusions 
In this paper we investigated empirically the sources of real exchange rate fluctuations in eight 
CEE economies and tried to find out whether these countries’ decisions to join the ERM II are 
consistent with our theoretical considerations. We expected that countries whose real exchange 
rate  changes  were  predominantly  due  to  nominal  disturbances  (i.e.  countries  reflecting  the 
disequilibrium view of exchange rates) should be more keen on the ERM II participation and the 
subsequent irrevocable fixing of the nominal exchange rate against the euro than those whose real 
rates were mainly driven by real shocks (i.e. those reflecting the real economy view). 
Surprisingly,  our  results  reveal  an  opposite  pattern:  the  real  exchange  rate  fluctuations  in  the 
ERM II participants – with the exception of Latvia, although this finding is specification sensitive 
–  conform  to  the  equilibrium  view  and  that  of  the  ERM II  “outs”  are  in  line  with  the 
disequilibrium  approach.  Neither  accounting  for  differences  in  nominal  exchange  rate 
                                                 
16 Two  further  differences  are  the  following:  firstly,  the  role  of  supply  disturbances  becomes  more  pronounced; 
indeed, the contribution of these innovations to real exchange rate fluctuations dominates that of demand shocks in 
some countries. Secondly, a larger part of real exchange rate volatility in Slovakia becomes attributable to nominal 
innovations. These results do not alter the general outcome of the alternative model, though.   24 
arrangements nor trying a different model specification alters this outcome. Admittedly, what we 
initially called relative real demand shocks cannot be plausibly interpreted in this way; the same 
applies to relative real supply shocks due to their perverse effect on the relative price level. We 
believe that these interpretation problems are due to the low dimension of our VAR. If there are 
more than three structural shock types, then what we identify is a commingling of the underlying 
shocks. The best solution – expanding our VAR – is not feasible due to the short time series 
available  for  the  transition countries under study. As argued above, though, the interpretation 
problems  are  in  fact  irrelevant  to  our  research  question,  which  amounts  to  disentangling 
permanent from temporary disturbances to real exchange rates, rather than identifying supply, 
demand and nominal shocks. Another possible explanation is that industrial production might be a 
poor  proxy  for  the  aggregate  income,  even  though  the  economies  under  study  are  transition 
economies with still underdeveloped service sectors. 
Nevertheless, even if we can solely speak of shocks that exert long-run influence on all system 
variables instead of real supply shocks, and of shocks that can affect the real exchange rate and 
prices but not the real income level in the long run instead of real demand shocks, the conclusion 
remains unaltered. The real rates in the ERM II participants are driven primarily by permanent 
shocks and thus behave in line with the real economy view, whereas the real rate fluctuations in 
the ERM II  “outs”  (and  perhaps Latvia) are mainly attributable to temporary disturbances and 
hence conform to the disequilibrium view. As noted in Section 2, a great importance of nominal 
shocks in explaining real exchange rate movements may be seen as a result of a high degree of 
nominal inertia. Our interpretation of these findings is therefore that the latter group of countries 
might be characterised by substantial nominal rigidities. We conclude that, insofar as the model 
employed is the proper one for our analysis and correctly specified, the sources of real exchange 
rate fluctuations were not the decisive factor behind the CEE countries’ decisions concerning the 
ERM II participation and the later adoption of the euro. 
The question arises whether the countries staying out of the ERM II should join it as quickly as 
possible and, on the other hand, whether its participants should reconsider floating their exchange 
rates. Our answer to both questions is a clear no. We strongly believe that it is only sensible for 
the three largest new EU member states to enter the ERM II once they have met (or at least are 
very certain to meet within two years) all the other Maastricht criteria, especially the criterion of a 
sustainable  government  financial  position.  Otherwise  adopting  a  soft  peg  may  result  in  a 
speculative  attack  and  a  forced  devaluation,  which  would  do  more  harm  to  macroeconomic 
stability than nominal exchange rate flexibility could ever do. As regards the five smaller member 
countries,  in  our  view  the  benefits  of  the  euro  adoption,  which  consist  in  microeconomic 
efficiency gains that enhance economic growth, exceed the potential stabilization costs. Therefore, 
we believe that these countries will be better-off within the EMU than they would be with their 
own independent currencies floating against the euro.   25 
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